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 The Effect of Wal-Mart
 Supercenters on Grocery
 Prices in New England
 Richard J. Volpe III and Nathalie Lavoie
 The competitive price effect of Wal-Mart Supercenters on national brand and private label
 grocery prices in New England is examined. We use primary price data collected on several
 identical products from six Supercenters in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island
 and from conventional supermarkets. Taking into account demographics, store charac-
 teristics, and market conditions, we show that Wal-Mart decreases prices by 6 to 7% for
 national brand goods and by 3 to 8% for private label goods. Price decreases are most sig-
 nificant in the dry grocery and dairy departments. Moreover, Wal-Mart sets grocery prices
 significantly lower than its competitors.
 The discount retailer Wal-Mart has been a popular topic of discussion and
 debate for more than a decade. Much of the recent controversy surrounding
 Wal-Mart in the economic literature and the popular press has focused on food re-
 tailing. Wal-Mart's meteoric rise to dominance in U.S. food retailing has motivated
 efforts to understand the effects of Supercenter stores on consumers, competitors,
 and the economy in general. The primary objective of this study is to estimate the
 competitive effect of Wal-Mart Supercenters on prices at conventional supermar-
 kets, that is, the extent to which Supercenters bring about a decrease in their rivals'
 price. Additionally, we estimate price differences between Supercenters and con-
 ventional stores to determine the savings realized by shopping at Supercenters.
 We examine these two objectives separately for national brands and private labels
 to determine whether Supercenters impact differently the two labels.
 Supercenters are Wal-Mart stores that offer entire lines of groceries in addition to
 all of the usual wares found at conventional Wal-Mart stores. Wal-Mart became the
 largest food retailer in the United States in 2003, largely through the expansion of
 Supercenters, and is currently the leading grocer worldwide (Progressive Grocer).
 Richard J. Volpe III is a Ph.D. student, Department of Agricultural and Resource
 Economics, University of California, Davis.
 0 Nathalie Lavoie is Assistant Professor, Department of Resource Economics, University
 of Massachusetts, Amherst.
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 By the end of 2003 there were 1,376 Supercenters in the United States, with over
 1,000 more planned for construction by 2008 (Bianco and Zellner). Much of the
 Supercenter expansion is projected to take place in regions such as New England
 and California, where Wal-Mart is newer and has a smaller presence compared
 to the South and Midwest, where the firm originated.
 Supercenters are the subject of as much, if not more, controversy than con-
 ventional Wal-Mart stores. A glance at news headlines on any given day reveals
 that Wal-Mart is confronting opposition from citizens and local governments in
 many of the locations where it chooses to erect Supercenters. The public outcry
 is spurred partly from Wal-Mart's low wages and substandard health care ben-
 efits to its nonunionized employees and the perception that jobs are lost when
 employee-unionized rivals go out of business due to Wal-Mart's entry (Daykin).
 For that reason, opposition in California has been particularly strong. Wal-Mart's
 announcement that it would open forty Supercenters in this state led to a four-
 month strike of grocery unions in 2003 to protest the cuts made in labor expenses
 by rival chains to compete. In 2004, residents of a suburb of Los Angeles protested
 and voted against the construction of a Supercenter citing low wages paid to em-
 ployees and Wal-Mart's refusal to allow labor unions (Zwiebach; Hudson and
 McWilliams). In the U.S. Northeast and in urban areas, the outcry also stems
 from the store's image. The construction of a store in Miami was blocked on the
 grounds that "its sprawling, suburban aesthetics and low-end appeal didn't con-
 form to the city's architectural and social vision for the project" (Hudson and
 McWilliams).
 Despite the ongoing controversy and the growing importance of Supercenters
 in all aspects of food retailing, the economic literature remains relatively scarce on
 the economic impact of Wal-Mart Supercenters. This is partly due to the absence
 of a data source; Wal-Mart does not participate in any of the public data collection
 services.
 Franklin examined the impact of Wal-Mart Supercenters on market concen-
 tration in the one hundred largest U.S. metropolitan areas in 1993 and 1999. He
 found that Supercenters have no significant effect on supermarket concentration.
 However, the market share obtained by Supercenters increases with time and is
 inversely proportional to the income of the local consumers in metropolitan areas.
 While there is no evidence in the literature that Supercenters are responsible
 for the closing of supermarkets, Supercenters have been found to have a negative
 effect on the sales of conventional supermarkets. For example, using a super-
 market's frequent-shopper data base, Singh, Hansen, and Blattberg find that the
 entry of a Wal-Mart Supercenter during the time period analyzed resulted in a
 loss of volume of 17% by that supermarket. They estimate that the volume loss
 amounted to a quarter of a million dollars in monthly revenues. Capps and Griffin
 estimated that Wal-Mart Supercenters were directly responsible for a 21% reduc-
 tion in sales for a regional chain of supermarkets in the Dallas/Fort Worth area
 of Texas. The combined effect of Supercenters and Wal-Mart's wholesale outlet,
 Sam's Club Stores, on supermarkets amounts to a loss of $15 to $17 billion in sales
 from supermarkets nationwide in 2001 (USA Today, cited by Jones).
 Wal-Mart Supercenters follow a different pricing strategy than most supermar-
 kets. This may affect how supermarkets compete in price when a Supercenter is
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 present. All Wal-Mart stores use everyday low pricing (EDLP), meaning that all
 products are marked up by the same percentage regardless of the price at which
 they were acquired (Vance and Scott). Sales, promotions, and advertising do not
 play heavily into the practice of EDLP. Most supermarkets, by contrast, employ
 high-low pricing (HLP), whereby most products are given a high markup but
 a percentage of goods, changing on a regular basis, are put on promotion. In
 many cases, promotional items are sold at a loss to the store with the intent to
 increase customer traffic. Using a game theoretical approach, Jones demonstrated
 that EDLP is profitable for Supercenters because it creates a stark difference in
 prices from supermarkets. Moreover, supermarkets would be more profitable if
 they switched to EDLP when competing with Supercenters. Supporting this no-
 tion, many of the largest supermarket chains in the nation are gradually lowering
 their prices and decreasing the frequency and size of promotions at some of their
 locations (Adamy).
 With the EDLP strategy and its countervailing market power toward manu-
 facturers (Dobson and Waterson; Chen; Wilke), Wal-Mart sets prices lower than
 its competitors. According to a 2002 UBS Warburg study, Wal-Mart Supercenters'
 prices are, on average, 14% lower than competing supermarkets (Bianco and
 Zellner). Studies surveyed by Hausman and Leibtag (2005) show Wal-Mart prices
 to be 8 to 27% lower than large supermarket chains.
 To date however, the impact of Wal-Mart Supercenters on prices at conventional
 supermarkets has not been explored much in the literature, with the exceptions
 of the studies by Woo et al. and Hausman and Leibtag (2004, 2005). Woo et al.
 monitored prices at conventional supermarkets both before and after the entry
 of a Wal-Mart Supercenter in the Athens, Georgia area. Their results showed that
 supermarkets lowered their prices significantly prior to the Supercenter's entry,
 but that prices gradually rose back to their original levels following entry. The
 only supermarkets showing lasting effects from the Supercenter entry were those
 with the highest prices at the beginning of the study.
 Hausman and Leibtag (2004) used A. C. Nielsen household panel data for 1998-
 2001 to study the bias on the CPI price index of the current treatment of Wal-Mart
 Supercenters in the index calculations. Using the same data, Hausman and Leibtag
 (2005) estimate the consumer welfare impact of the entry Supercenters in the U.S.
 food market by estimating the compensating variation. In the context of these two
 studies, they also examine the price difference at superstores versus supermarkets.
 The price differences are examined by food categories, but using simple averages
 across markets. In this comparison, the authors do not isolate the competitive
 effect of supercenters on competing stores. They find that, overall, superstores'
 prices are 27% lower than traditional supermarkets. However, the compensating
 variation is broken into two parts: (a) a variety effect from having access to a new
 outlet, and (b) an indirect price effect associated with the decrease in price from
 existing outlet.1 They estimate the variety effect to be 20.2% of food expenditure,
 and the indirect price effect to be 4.8% of food expenditure. Thus, they find a
 substantial benefit for households who have the choice to shop at Supercenters,
 that is, a total welfare effect of 25% of food expenditure.
 This study contributes to the literature on the economic impact of Wal-Mart
 Supercenters and is unique in four respects. First, we estimate both the competi-
 tive effect of Supercenters on prices of competitors and the discount realized by
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 shopping at a Supercenter, by grocery department. The impact of Wal-Mart is
 likely to vary by grocery department because retailers increasingly employ cate-
 gory management tools and each supermarket category is treated as a strategic
 business unit in pricing, merchandising, promotions, and product mix (Singh,
 Hansen, and Blattberg). Second, given that Wal-Mart does not participate in any
 of the public data collection services, we use a unique data set consisting of prices
 collected directly off the shelves of the stores sampled. Third, we focus on the
 effect of Supercenters in the states of New England (Connecticut, Massachusetts,
 and Rhode Island), a new region of expansion for Supercenters and also a region
 that is both wealthier and more densely populated than the U.S. South and Mid-
 west, where Supercenters originated. Fourth, we conduct separate analyses for
 national brand and private label products. National brand products are obtained
 from national distributors and therefore are identical across all stores. National
 brand products are more heavily advertised and are more popular among higher-
 income shoppers. Private label products, alternatively, are produced through a
 form of vertical coordination and are heterogeneous across different chains. De-
 spite having higher markups, they are universally cheaper than their national
 brand substitutes and appeal to lower-income shoppers.2 Examining separately
 national brands and private labels enables us to shed some light on the impact of
 Supercenters on the national brand/private label margin and on strategic efforts
 by supermarkets to maintain consumer loyalty.
 Data
 Because Wal-Mart does not participate in any public data collection services, it
 was necessary to gather primary price data. The data were gathered from eighteen
 stores throughout the states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. The
 selection of the eighteen stores was made by the following criteria: six of the stores
 are Wal-Mart Supercenters, another six are the largest supermarkets, in terms of
 floor size, found within five miles of each of the Supercenters. Henceforth, these
 stores are referred to as "competing stores." The final six stores are used as compar-
 ison stores to the six supermarkets competing with Wal-Mart Supercenters, and
 they will be referred to as "comparison stores." Using data from the 2000 Census
 as well as the 2004 Trade Dimensions Retail Data Directory, we selected stores that
 shared many similarities with the six competing supermarkets in terms of size,
 market conditions, and demographics.3
 The fifty-four products sampled in this study were selected from a larger list
 compiled by Cotterill (1999a) and span the six major supermarket departments:
 grocery, dairy, frozen food, health and beauty aids (HBAs), meat, and produce.4
 The products were selected in proportion to departmental shares of sales calcu-
 lated by Cotterill (1999a) in order to represent a typical consumer's market bas-
 ket. This explains, for example, why more goods were sampled from the grocery
 department than from the dairy department. In every department the selection
 of products was divided evenly between national brand and private label goods,
 with the exception of the produce department, in which only national brand goods
 were available. Taking into account that private label products differ across dif-
 ferent supermarket chains, we used data from Consumer Reports to select products
 that do not vary much in quality among manufacturers.
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 Figure 1. Average total price of the national brand (30 goods) and
 private label (24 goods) market baskets, by store category
 National Brand Private Label
 The prices of the products were recorded directly off the shelves of the eighteen
 stores. Only nonpromotional prices were recorded, which may have consequences
 on the magnitudes of our estimated price difference. We discuss and deal with this
 issue in the results section. Figure 1 reports the average price of the national brand
 and private label market baskets for the three store categories. Data gathering was
 performed within a three-week period in October 2004 to avoid any time-series
 trends in the data.
 Figure 1 shows that for both national brand and private label products, the
 average price of the entire basket is lower at competing stores than at com-
 parison stores. Moreover, Supercenters have the lowest average price for both
 market baskets and the average price difference between Supercenters and com-
 peting stores exceeds the average difference between competing and comparison
 stores.
 Price Indexes and Model Formulation
 To examine the impact of Wal-Mart Supercenters on the price of food prod-
 ucts, we constructed price indexes by supermarket departments. Binkley and
 Connor (1998) have shown that fresh goods (red meats, milk, and produce) are
 priced differently than packaged goods (products in the "dry grocery" and "health
 and beauty" department). Departmental price indexes were constructed using
 expenditure-weighted relative prices. Expenditure-weighted relative prices have
 been used in previous work examining supermarket prices (Cotterill, 1999b; Woo
 et al.; Yu and Connor). Weighting prices by expenditure allows for proper ac-
 counting of the different nature of market baskets as well as respects the patterns
 of consumption in the United States. Formally, the indexes are given by:
 .-100 (1) 10
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 where Vijk is the price index for brand i (i = N for national brand or P for private
 label), department j, and store k. Wmj is the weight assigned to good m in depart-
 ment j and Pmijk is the relative price of good m of brand i in department j at store k.
 The relative prices Pmijk were obtained by standardizing each observed shelf price
 by the average price paid for the given product across all stores.5 Thus, the price
 index Vijk is constructed as the weighted average price of the Mj goods of brand i
 in department j of store k, divided by the same expression for store 1 (the reference
 store) and multiplied by one hundred. The reference store is the Supercenter in
 Raynham, MA, for national brand indexes and the Supercenter in Jewett City, CT,
 for private label indexes. These stores were chosen because across departments
 they have the lowest average prices.
 The weight Wmj is the expenditure on good m, found in the market basket of
 department j, relative to the total expenditure on all goods sampled in department
 j. It is calculated as
 (2) Wmj = Pm Cmj
 m=1 -Pmj Cmj
 where Pmj is the average price of good m in department j across all eighteen stores
 sampled for this study and Cmj is the estimated per capita annual consumption of
 good m in department j in the United States in 2003 as measured by the Economic
 Research Service of the USDA.
 Tables 1 and 2 display the descriptive statistics for the departmental price in-
 dexes. They reveal two trends in the price indexes. First, for all departments
 except for national brand meat, Supercenters have the lowest price indexes (least
 expensive) and comparison stores have the highest price indexes (most expen-
 sive). Second, the coefficient of variation statistics reveal that the Supercenters
 generally have the lowest price volatility while competing stores have the high-
 Table 1. Summary statistics for expenditure-weighted national
 brand price indexes
 Grocery Dairy Frozen Food HBA Meat Produce
 Mean
 Supercenters 102.62 100.36 108.03 107.76 100.76 111.47
 Compete 126.67 137.10 145.97 133.25 139.26 141.52
 Compare 143.19 168.76 159.64 141.03 132.89 159.50
 Standard Deviation
 Supercenters 1.58 0.28 8.24 5.87 1.39 5.92
 Compete 12.56 21.24 22.44 11.76 2.21 19.40
 Compare 7.60 6.35 15.91 11.72 12.60 11.23
 Coefficient of Variation
 Supercenters 1.54% 0.03% 7.63% 5.48% 1.38% 5.31%
 Compete 9.92% 15.57% 15.37% 8.83% 1.58% 13.71%
 Compare 5.31% 3.76% 9.97% 8.31% 9.48% 7.04%
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 Table 2. Summary statistics for expenditure-weighted private label
 price indexes
 Grocery Dairy Frozen Food HBA Meat
 Mean
 Supercenters 102.36 100.38 103.73 119.50 134.77
 Compete 142.43 133.84 138.58 128.09 129.09
 Compare 158.64 158.43 151.93 151.58 147.68
 Standard Deviation
 Supercenters 2.10 0.30 4.15 9.55 18.37
 Compete 14.64 21.67 33.16 12.68 18.64
 Compare 17.80 14.59 25.35 30.25 30.38
 Coefficient of Variation
 Supercenters 2.05% 0.30% 3.99% 7.99% 13.63%
 Compete 10.28% 16.19% 23.93% 9.90% 14.44%
 Compare 11.22% 9.21% 16.69% 19.95% 20.57%
 est price volatility. One possible explanation is that Supercenters reduce the
 ability of supermarkets to coordinate prices and promotional activities. Marion,
 Heimforth, and Bailey found this to be true in the context of heterogeneous com-
 petition among supermarkets and larger warehouse stores. In addition, stores
 competing with Wal-Mart have been found to engage in both price and nonprice
 strategies (Khanna and Tice). Nonprice strategies include improving service, im-
 age, or variety. Several of the competing supermarkets sampled for this study
 were recently renovated, with features such as gasoline stations, coffee shops,
 and bookstores. If competing stores use a greater number of strategic instruments
 to compete with Supercenters than comparison stores, we may expect competing
 stores to have the greatest overall price variability among the store categories.
 The price indexes for all three store categories were pooled to enable a direct
 test of the effect of Wal-Mart Supercenters on supermarket prices. The resulting
 model can be expressed as
 (3) V = Po + P1 DAIRY + P2 FROZEN + P3 HBA + 14 MEAT + 35 PRODUCE
 + 16 COMPETE + f7 COMPARE + Ps COMPETEDAIRY
 + 19 COMPETEFROZ + 3io COMPETEHBA + 11 COMPETEMEAT
 + P12 COMPETEPROD + x13 COMPDAIRY + x14 COMPFROZ
 + 115 COMPHBA + 116 COMPMEAT + x17 COMPPROD + 8X + u
 where V represents the expenditure-weighted relative price indexes, as de-
 scribed above. DAIRY, FROZEN, HBA (health and beauty aids), MEAT, and
 PRODUCE are binary variables included to capture price differences across de-
 partments. Therefore, the reference category is grocery. COMPETE and COM-
 PARE are binary variables that represent the different supermarket categories.
 COMPETE equals one if the supermarket is a store competing with the Super-
 center, and zero otherwise. COMPARE equals 1 if the supermarket is a store
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 located further away from a Supercenter and represents a comparison store,
 and zero otherwise. These variables are also interacted with the departmental
 binaries. We expect the results to indicate that Supercenters have the lowest
 average prices among all store categories and that the competing stores have
 lower average prices than the comparison stores. Hence the coefficients for COM-
 PETE and COMPARE are anticipated to have positive signs, and the coeffi-
 cient on COMPARE is expected to be greater in magnitude than the coefficient
 on COMPETE, to represent this pattern for the grocery department. Given the
 proper mapping of coefficients, we expect similar results to be realized for all
 departments.6
 X represents a vector of variables consisting of demographics, store character-
 istics, and market conditions. These variables, stressed in importance by a survey
 of the literature on supermarket pricing and competition (see Volpe), measure
 income, population density, the distance to the nearest large competitor, store
 size, concentration, and the percentage of minorities in the local population. We
 describe these variables next.
 INCOME is a binary variable equal to 1 if the city or town, associated with
 the index value, has a median household income greater than $45,725, that is, in
 the upper half of the data set. Given that consumers become less price sensitive
 as income increases (Hoch et al.) we expect the coefficient to be positive. The
 binary nature of this variable is intended to reflect the average difference in prices
 between areas of "high income" versus "low income" in New England.7 Income
 data from the 2000 Census were used to generate this variable.
 POPDENS represents population density and is expected to have a negative
 sign, as food retailers have greater incentive to compete when consumers can
 easily travel among stores (Lamm; Cotterill, 1986). Data on population and land
 area for the cities and towns were available from the 2000 Census.
 Concentration data were not available at levels disaggregated enough for this
 study, and therefore two proxies are used in place of the conventional measure-
 ments of industry concentration, for example, four-firm concentration ratio and
 the Herfindalh-Hirschman Index. DTLC is the distance, in miles, to the nearest
 supermarket or Supercenter. CONCENTRATED is a binary variable equal to one
 if the town or city associated with the price index has fewer than three large food
 retailers. Both of these coefficients are expected to be positive. The locations of the
 stores in each town or city were obtained from the Trade Dimensions 2004 Retail
 Data Directory and driving distances among stores were determined using the
 electronic service Mapquest.
 SSIZE is the size of the store, in thousands of square feet. According to Binkley
 and Connor (1996, 1998), store size can affect prices in two opposite directions.
 Larger stores may enjoy economies of scale and thus charge lower prices. How-
 ever, larger stores may also stock more items and provide more services, which
 contribute to the rise in costs and thus prices. Binkley and Connor (1998) argue
 that the second effect dominates for conventional retailers. The first effect most
 likely dominates for Wal-Mart. Thus, the expected sign on SSIZE is indeterminate
 for both national brands and private labels.8 Data on store size in square footage
 were available from Trade Dimensions 2004 Retail Data Directory.
 BH is the percentage of blacks and Hispanics living in the associated town.
 Blacks and Hispanics are more sensitive to grocery prices (Hoch et al.). Thus, this
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 variable is expected to be negative. Demographic data were obtained from the
 2000 Census.
 Results
 Equation (3) was estimated separately for national brand (model A) and private
 label (model B) price indexes for ease of interpretation and readability. The results
 of the generalized least squares (GLS) estimations are compiled in table 3. The
 models were estimated using GLS rather than ordinary least squares (OLS) be-
 cause preliminary regression results indicated heteroskedasticity resulting from
 different variances across departments. The models have high-explanatory power,
 as evidenced by the models' F-statistics and the adjusted R2 values. Diagnostics
 revealed no multicollinearity problem among the variables in the X vector. Con-
 sistent price data were not available for private label produce and therefore price
 indexes were not calculated for those goods. As a result, Model A has 108 observa-
 tions (six departments at eighteen stores) while Model B has ninety observations
 (five departments at eighteen stores).
 The demographics and market conditions all have expected signs, with the ex-
 ception of BH, which is not statistically significant. SSIZE is negative and signifi-
 cant for both national brands and private labels indicating that larger stores have
 lower prices. The likely explanation for this result is that economies of scale en-
 able large stores, such as Supercenters and large conventional supermarkets, to be
 more efficient and charge lower prices. The coefficients indicate that a 1,000 square
 feet increase in store size results in an average decrease in price of 0.25% for na-
 tional brands and a 0.88% decrease in price for private labels, when the coefficient
 is expressed as a percentage of the average value of the dependent variable.9
 The coefficient on INCOME is positive and statistically significant for both
 brands. In percentage terms, the coefficients indicate that the price of national
 brands is 7% higher, and the average price of private labels is 24% higher in higher-
 income locations in New England than in lower-income locations. We posit that
 this price increase reflects the price premium paid for groceries in high-income
 areas, which may be determined in part by differences in customer service or
 amenities available in-store. Differences in private label quality are unlikely to be
 a determinant of this price difference, as private labels are identical within chains.
 In general, expressed as a percentage of the average value of the dependent vari-
 able, the effects of the demographics and market conditions on price are greater
 in magnitude for private label products than for the national brand products,
 except for the effect of market concentration (CONCENTRATED). This pattern
 supports the findings that supermarkets have greater control over private label
 prices as opposed to the national brand prices set by manufacturers (Mills) and
 that consumers who purchase private label goods are more price sensitive than
 those who primarily purchase national brands (Dhar and Hoch).
 Tables 4 and 5 give the expected price index value for each department and
 store type, holding all demographics, market conditions, and store characteristics
 constant and adjusted for in-store promotional activity. Column 6 in each table
 is of particular interest. It reports the average price difference in percentage term
 between competing stores and comparison stores. Those percentages represent
 the estimated competitive effect of the presence of Wal-Mart Supercenters on the
 prices at conventional supermarkets.
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 Table 3. Regression Results
 Model A Model B
 National Brands Private Labels
 Intercept 113.476*** 139.961***
 (7.430) (14.665)
 DAIRY -2.258 -1.976
 (6.609) (10.385)
 FROZEN 5.412 1.373
 (6.023) (10.891)
 HBA 4.814 17.135*
 (4.681) (9.467)
 MEAT -1.851 32.404***
 (4.818) (9.464)
 PRODUCE 8.852
 (5.530)
 COMPETE 18.765*** 27.897***
 (5.131) (10.722)
 COMPARE 32.041*** 41.297***
 (5.171) (10.796)
 COMPETEDAIRY 12.684 -6.617
 (9.347) (14.687)
 COMPETEFROZ 13.888 -5.224
 (8.518) (15.402)
 COMPETEHBA 1.764 -21.472**
 (6.620) (13.388)
 COMPETEMEAT 14.444** -45.749***
 (6.813) (13.384)
 COMPETEPROD 5.992
 (7.821)
 COMPDAIRY 27.828*** 1.763
 (9.347) (14.687)
 COMPFROZ 11.044 -8.090
 (8.518) (15.402)
 COMPHBA -6.974 -24.194*
 (6.620) (13.388)
 COMPMEAT -8.447 -43.365***
 (6.813) (10.428)
 COMPPROD 7.461
 (7.821)
 INCOME 8.570*** 21.743***
 (2.493) (4.826)
 POPDENS -0.638 -1.581*
 (0.427) (0.826)
 DTLC 0.627 0.887
 (0.499) (0.966)
 SSIZE -0.297*** -0.795***
 (0.094) (0.182)
 CONCENTRATED 7.561*** 1.031
 (3.058) (5.920)
 (Continued)
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 Table 3. Continued
 Model A Model B
 National Brands Private Labels
 BH 0.020 0.168
 (0.132) (0.256)
 N 108 90
 F 20.51*** 6.81***
 Adjusted R2 0.81 0.57
 ***: Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. **: Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. *: Coefficient
 is significant at the 0.10 level. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
 A decrease in average prices is attributed to the presence of Supercenters in
 all departments except for national brand meat. This counterintuitive finding for
 the national brand of meat is not statistically significant. It may be attributed to
 a temporary pricing anomaly during the data collection time frame or a small
 sample size for meat.
 For both national brand and private label products, the largest competitive ef-
 fect of Supercenters occurs in the dairy department with estimated decreases in
 prices of 17% and 12%, respectively. Among national brand products, the grocery
 and produce departments are also significantly affected by the presence of Super-
 centers. Supercenters cause a 9% decrease in the price of national brands of both
 grocery items and produce. Significant average price decreases are attributed to
 Supercenters for private label HBA and meat products. We are unable to conclude
 that the presence of Wal-Mart Supercenters has a statistically significant effect on
 the prices of frozen food items, regardless of the brand type. Finally, the grocery
 department for private label goods is not significantly impacted by the presence
 of Supercenters.
 Column 4 and 5 of tables 4 and 5 depict the average price differences between
 the Wal-Mart Supercenters and the conventional supermarkets. These differ-
 ences indicate to what extent Supercenter prices are lower than competing stores
 Table 4. Expected expenditure-weighted relative price indexes by
 department for national brand goods (Model A)13
 (1): (2): (3): (4): (5): (6):
 Wal-Mart Competing Comparison (1-2) (1-3) (2-3)
 Supercenters Stores Stores % difference % difference % difference
 Grocery 113.476 132.241 145.517 -14.19*** -22.02*** -9.12***
 Dairy 111.218 142.667 171.087 -22.04*** -34.99*** -16.61***
 Frozen 118.888 151.541 161.973 -21.55*** -26.60*** -6.44
 Food
 HBA 118.290 138.819 143.357 -14.79*** -17.49*** -3.16
 Meat 111.625 144.834 135.219 -22.93*** -17.45*** 7.11
 Produce 122.328 147.085 161.830 -16.82*** -24.41*** -9.11**
 ***: Difference is significant at the 0.01 level **: Significant at the 0.05 level *: Significant at the 0.10 level
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 Table 5. Expected expenditure-weighted relative price indexes by
 department for private label goods (Model B)
 (1): (2): (3): (4): (5): (6):
 Wal-Mart Competing Comparison (1-2) (1-3) (2-3)
 Supercenters Stores Stores % difference % difference % difference
 Grocery 139.961 167.858 181.258 -16.62*** -22.78*** -7.39
 Dairy 137.985 159.265 181.045 -13.36*** -23.78*** -12.03**
 Frozen 141.334 164.007 174.541 -13.82*** -19.03*** -6.04
 Food
 HBA 157.096 163.521 174.199 -3.93 -9.82** -6.13"*
 Meat 172.365 154.513 170.297 11.55** 1.21 -9.27*
 ***: Difference is significant at the 0.01 level. **: Significant at the 0.05 level. *: Significant at the 0.10 level.
 (column 4) and lower than comparison stores (column 5). The differences are
 greater in magnitude than those calculated between competing and comparison
 stores. With two exceptions, Supercenters prices are significantly lower, on av-
 erage, than those of conventional stores. The two exceptional cases are private
 label HBA products, for which the estimated difference is insignificant, and pri-
 vate label meat, for which Supercenters have the highest average prices among
 all store categories. The HBA department is unique in this study, as it comprises
 products that are also available at many other store types, including pharmacies
 and other mass merchandisers. Therefore, greater overall price competition and
 lower average price differences between Supercenters and competing stores, rel-
 ative to other departments, is expected for the HBA department. As mentioned
 previously, the results for the meat department call for further investigation.
 Column 4 of table 4 indicates that Supercenters price their national brand prod-
 ucts between 14 and 23% lower than competing supermarkets. The estimated
 national brand price differences between Supercenters and competing stores are
 generally larger than the corresponding private label differences, which vary be-
 tween 4 and 17% (column 4 of table 5). The largest price differences are for na-
 tional brand of dairy, frozen food, and meat products, and private label grocery
 products. As expected, the price difference is larger between Supercenters and
 comparison stores. Supercenter prices are lower than comparison stores by 17 to
 35% depending on the national brand department (column 5 of table 4), and by
 10 to 24% for private label departments (column 5 of table 5). The largest price
 differences are for dairy products for both national brands and private labels.
 The prices collected for this study did not include promotional activity. How-
 ever, promotional activity is consistent within chains, that is, the same products
 sell at the same promotional price across locations. Therefore, we adjusted the
 expected price index values for promotional activity in order to better reflect the
 prices that consumers actually paid. Using promotional flyers from Stop n' Shop
 and Big Y throughout the month of October 2006, we calculated the average share
 of market basket products that are on sale in these supermarkets in any given
 week. In doing so, we assume that the promotional activity of these regional
 chains in October 2006 is indicative of the promotional activity two years prior.
 Additionally, we used the promotional prices, in 2004 dollars, to calculate the
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 Table 6. Estimated overall price discounts resulting from
 promotional activity14
 Competing Comparison
 Stores Stores
 National Brand 3.81% 4.90%
 Private Label 3.58% 4.93%
 percentage discounts for products on promotion. Table 6 reports the estimated
 overall average percentage discounts for consumers' market baskets by brand
 and store category.
 Table 7 reports the average departmental shares of sales as determined by
 Cotterill (1999a). These shares of sales were used to weight the average depart-
 mental price differences reported in tables 4 and 5. The results, reported in table 8,
 represent the average overall competitive effects of Supercenters on prices at con-
 ventional supermarkets. They correspond to the overall average price differences
 between competing and comparison stores.10 The estimates were calculated in
 two ways. With method 1, the weighted price difference was calculated using
 all of the percentage differences reported in tables 4 and 5. Method 2 utilizes
 only those effects that were found to be statistically significant. The overall ef-
 fects incorporating promotional discounts, as shown in table 6, are also reported.
 These effects were obtained by adjusting the expected prices for comparison and
 competing stores by the overall discounts presented in table 6.
 The overall competitive effect of the presence of Supercenters on supermarket
 prices ranges from a 6.83 to a 7.23% price decrease for national brand goods and
 a 3.28 to a 8.01% price decrease for private labels, using nonpromotional prices.
 Promotional prices lower the estimated overall effect of Supercenters. However,
 the impact is modest, ranging from 0.4 to 1.3% across brands and store categories.
 Given that the private label estimate calculated using method 1 is statisti-
 cally insignificant, our results show that the overall effect of Supercenters is
 greater for national brand products. National brand products are universally
 more expensive and more heavily promoted than their private label substitutes.
 Therefore this finding is in agreement with the ongoing trend of lower prices in
 Table 7. Departmental shares of sales
 Department Share of Sales
 Grocery 46.07%
 Dairy 7.99
 Frozen food 7.05%
 HBA 5.77%
 Meat 14.52
 Produce 18.61%
 Source: Cotterill (1999a)
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 Table 8. The estimated overall competitive effect of the presence of
 Supercenters, by model
 Estimated Overall Effect of Wal-Mart
 Method 1 Method 2
 Without With Without With
 Model promotions promotions promotions promotions
 A. National brand -6.83%* -5.77% -7.23%* -6.48%
 B. Private label -8.01% -6.71% -3.28%* -2.84%
 ***: Difference is significant at the 0.01 level **: Significant at the 0.05 level *: Significant at the 0.10 level
 conventional supermarkets as a response to Wal-Mart, as noted by Adamy. More-
 over, we may expect a lower competitive effect on private label prices because
 their heterogeneity relative to Wal-Mart private labels is such that the competition
 is not as strong for those goods as for national brands.
 Applying the same weighting scheme to the average price differences between
 Supercenters and conventional supermarkets, table 9 reports the overall price dif-
 ferences by store category and brand type. The impact of promotional prices was
 also incorporated into these overall price differences. Only statistically significant
 price differences were included in the calculations.
 On average, our results indicate that Supercenter prices are lower than prices
 at competing stores by 14 to 17% for national brand products and by 7 to 10% for
 private labels. Supercenter prices are overall lower than comparison stores by 19
 to 23% for national brands and 14 to 18% for private labels. The estimated impact
 of promotional activity shown in table 9 is greater in magnitude than that shown
 in table 8. This is consistent with Supercenters exhibiting no promotional activity
 in contrast to supermarkets.
 The extent to which Supercenter prices are lower than conventional supermar-
 kets is consistent with the estimates available in studies surveyed by Hausman
 and Leibtag (2004, 2005), that is, between 8 and 27%. The average price differ-
 ences between Supercenters and supermarkets are greater (in percentage terms)
 for national brand products. One likely explanation of this difference between
 Table 9. The estimated overall price difference between
 supercenters and supermarkets
 Competing Stores Comparison Stores
 Without With Without With
 Model promotions promotions promotions promotions
 A. National brand -17.13%*** -13.84% -22.90%*** -18.93%
 B. Private label -9.90%** -6.80% -17.66*** -14.30%
 ***: Difference is significant at the 0.01 level **: Significant at the 0.05 level *: Significant at the 0.10 level
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 brands is the process through which the food retailers obtain their wares. National
 brand products are purchased from national brand manufacturers and distribu-
 tors. Dobson and Waterson and Chen have argued that Wal-Mart possesses market
 power to countervail that of manufacturers, which drives down the prices of the
 products purchased from suppliers. The supermarket chains of New England such
 as Stop n' Shop and IGA are too small to possess such power, resulting in a cost
 advantage for Wal-Mart Supercenters. Private label products, alternatively, are
 produced through a form of vertical integration and countervailing power plays
 less of a role in the process by which Wal-Mart obtains its Great Value product
 line.
 The margin between brands has been a frequently visited topic in the literature
 on supermarket pricing (Berges-Sennou, Bontems, and Requillart). With Wal-Mart
 Supercenters taking an increasing importance in food retailing, it becomes rele-
 vant to question their effect on the national brand/private label margin. We can
 shed some light on this question. According to our results, Supercenters have a
 greater price impact on national brands than on private labels. Combining this
 result with the fact that national brands are more expensive than private labels
 suggests that Supercenters reduce the national brand/private label margin of the
 supermarkets with which they compete.
 Discussion and Conclusions
 Wal-Mart is introducing Supercenters at a fast pace in the United States, es-
 pecially in regions such as New England and California where Wal-Mart has a
 smaller presence. The projected introduction of a Supercenter typically creates
 much controversy and debate concerning the economic impacts of the new store.
 In this article, we examine one aspect of the impact of introducing Supercenters,
 that is the effect on grocery prices. More specifically, using a unique data set, we
 examine the competitive effect of Wal-Mart Supercenters on prices at conven-
 tional supermarkets in New England. This effect was examined for the six major
 supermarket departments (dairy, frozen goods, health and beauty aids (HBA),
 meat, produce, and dry grocery) as well as both national brand and private label
 goods. We also examine the extent to which Wal-Mart's grocery prices are lower
 than those at conventional supermarkets. Thus, this article sheds some light on
 the pricing strategy of Wal-Mart Supercenters and the response of supermarkets
 when facing direct competition from a Supercenter.
 The primary findings of this study are as follows:
 1) Wal-Mart Supercenters result in a decrease in grocery prices between 6 and
 7% for national brand goods at conventional supermarkets competing within
 a radius of 5 miles from the Supercenter. The associated decrease in the price
 of private label goods is between 3 and 8%. These findings are in line with
 those in the literature, more specifically those of Hausman and Leibtag (2005)
 who found an indirect price effect of Wal-Mart of 5% of consumer expenditure.
 Given that national brand goods are more expensive, Supercenters lower the
 price margin between branded and unbranded goods.
 2) The greatest impact of Wal-Mart Supercenters, in terms of price decreases, is
 in the grocery and dairy departments for both national brands and private
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 labels. Lower prices are also observed for national brand produce, and private
 label HBA. Supercenters have no statistically significant effect on goods in the
 frozen food department.
 3) Taking into account market concentration, demographic variables, and store
 characteristics, Wal-Mart Supercenters price national brand and private label
 products significantly lower than conventional supermarkets. The estimated
 average price difference between Supercenters and supermarkets for national
 brand products ranges from 14 to 23%. The corresponding differences for
 private labels are lower, ranging from 7 to 18%.
 The greater overall competitive effect of Supercenters on national brand than
 on private label prices may reflect a strategic effort by competing supermarkets
 to increase consumer traffic or maintain customer loyalty. Dhar and Hoch found
 that a common strategy for supermarkets to increase consumer traffic is to lower
 the price and improve promotions on national brands as well as carry a greater
 number and assortment of national brands. In a region such as New England,
 which is wealthy relative to the nation as a whole, consumer demand for national
 brand products is high and this strategy may be particularly effective.
 The magnitude of the impact of Wal-Mart Supercenters can be conceptualized
 in the context of food expenditures. An average American family, with a total
 household income between $50,000 and $69,999, spends $1,300 per person an-
 nually on food intended for at-home consumption.1 This range encompasses
 many of the cities and towns sampled for this study, as well as much of New
 England. According to our results, a family can expect to save between $37 and
 $104 per person annually by shopping exclusively at conventional supermar-
 kets located within a 5-mile radius from a Supercenter, allowing for the shop-
 ping basket to consist of some combination of national brand and private label
 products.12
 The annual savings for consumers shopping entirely at Supercenters are larger.
 The size of the savings depends on whether the alternative supermarket directly
 competes with a Supercenter or not. Consumers living within 5 miles of Super-
 centers can achieve estimated annual savings ranging from $88 to $223 per person
 annually, if they shop at Supercenters rather than at competing supermarkets.
 Shoppers willing to travel from cities and towns without Supercenters can save
 between $186 and $298 per person annually on grocery expenditures by shopping
 at Supercenters relative to conventional supermarkets.
 Note, however, that these estimated savings attributed to Supercenters may
 not accurately reflect consumer behavior due to the effect of promotions on the
 composition of the consumer's basket. Blattberg and Neslin found that promo-
 tional price cuts have striking effects on sales in the short term. For example, the
 authors determined that, a national brand product given a 10% price decrease and
 a display advertisement sees an average sales increase of 101% during the pro-
 motion. Given that consumers flock to promotional items, the estimated savings
 calculated above must be considered upper bounds.
 The controversies surrounding Wal-Mart beg the question "Is Wal-Mart good
 for the economy?" This question can typically only be partially answered be-
 cause so many economic factors must be considered. Wal-Mart's effects on cus-
 tomers, employees, competitors, and distributors must all be taken into account.
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 In this article, we focused on the retail price impact of Supercenters. Based on
 our empirical results, we conclude that Wal-Mart Supercenters have a posi-
 tive welfare effect on price-sensitive consumers. Consumers who seek to pur-
 chase their groceries as inexpensively as possible benefit from the presence of
 Supercenters.
 The results presented in this article suggest possible avenues for further re-
 search. One such exploration is the applicability of these results to the national
 level. Our results are in line with previous estimates of price differences between
 Supercenters and supermarkets (Bianco and Zellner; Hausman and Leibtag, 2005).
 However, in estimating the price reductions at supermarkets resulting from the
 presence of Supercenters we have little basis for comparison in the economic lit-
 erature. New England is wealthier and more densely populated than the United
 States on average, and the supermarket chains visited for this study were regional
 chains.
 Arguments can be made supporting the notion that the effect of Supercenters
 on conventional supermarket prices would be less pronounced in New England
 than in the rest of the nation on average. The market share and profits reaped
 by Supercenters share an inverse relationship with income and concentration
 (Franklin). If Supercenters obtain lower market shares or less consumer traffic in
 New England relative to the United States as a whole, then supermarkets may
 react to Supercenters' presence in two ways. They could place less weight on a
 price response and more weight on a product differentiation response, such as
 increasing the quantity and/or quality of service provided. Supermarkets could
 also react generally less strongly to Supercenters' presence in higher-income re-
 gions. Both of these reactions would translate into a lower effect of Supercenters
 on grocery prices in New England than in the United States on average. Alter-
 natively, arguments can be made in favor of Supercenters having a higher effect
 relative to the United States as a whole. Our results suggest that grocery prices
 share positive relationships with household income and concentration. If this re-
 sult holds on a national level, as found by Lamm and Cotterill (1999b) in the case
 of income and by Lamm, Cotterill (1986), and Yu and Connor in the case of con-
 centration, then grocery prices may be higher on average in New England than
 in other regions of the United States. Thus, unless higher prices are associated
 with higher costs, there may be more possibilities to lower prices, which would
 result in greater price effects attributed to the presence of Supercenters. It would
 therefore be worthwhile to apply this study to regions such as the southeast,
 where household income is lower than the U.S. average and where Supercenters
 are established for the longest time, or the west coast where income is high and
 Wal-Mart's presence is relatively new.
 In addition to the implications resulting from the regression analysis, the coef-
 ficient of variation (CV) pattern in the price indexes show that for nearly all de-
 partments and for both national brand and private label products, supermarkets
 competing with Supercenters have higher price variability than those located fur-
 ther away from the nearest Supercenter. This finding may reflect a reduction in the
 ability of supermarkets to coordinate promotional patterns. It may also reflect the
 presence of nonprice competitive strategies in addition to standard price-cutting
 strategy. In fact, several of the competing supermarkets visited for data collec-
 tion were recently renovated, featuring amenities such as gas stations, salons, or
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 coffee shops. The CV pattern calls for an exploration of the strategies utilized by
 supermarkets when faced with competition from Supercenters. In general, more
 research is needed on the short-run and long-run price and nonprice response
 of supermarkets to the entry of Wal-Mart Supercenters. Such research would en-
 able a better understanding of the profitability and viability of the supermarket
 industry in the context of the rapid proliferation of Wal-Mart Supercenters.
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 Endnotes
 1The variety effect accounts for the lower prices at supercenters relative to traditional supermarkets,
 as well as the value of having access to a new outlet. It is obtained by comparing the consumers'
 expenditure at existing and new outlets at post introduction prices with consumers' expenditure at
 the reservation price for the new outlet, while keeping utility constant. The reservation price is the
 price such that the demand for the new outlet is zero.
 2For a review of the literature on national brand and private label products, see Berges-Sennou,
 Bontems, and Requillart.
 3See Appendix A for information on the stores sampled and their location.
 4See Appendix B for the complete market basket as well as the average price of each product at the
 18 stores.
 5Expressing prices in relative term eliminates the effect of package-size discrepancy across products.
 6For example, the expected price index value for the dairy department at competing stores is given
 by (o + ,1 + 6 + 8, while the expected price index for the dairy department at comparison stores
 is (o + 11 + P7 + 13.
 7Areas falling below the median income value in the data set are not necessarily low-income areas
 as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau.
 8Note that five of the twelve conventional retailers in our sample are relatively large supermarkets
 with store areas greater than 50,000 square feet. Those stores have amenities, such as a coffee shop or
 deli area, which are typically not found in smaller stores.
 9The mean national brand departmental price index is 118.65 while the mean private label index is
 90.69.
 10Given that there is no private label produce, the department share of sales are adjusted accordingly
 for private labels. For example, the share of grocery is 56.88% for private label.
 1This value is from the 2004 Bureau of Labor Statistics report Consumer Expenditures in 2004.
 12The savings figures are calculated based on the range of price decrease estimates reported in
 table 8. The percentage price differences between competing and comparison supermarkets range
 from 2.84% to 8.01% across national brands and private labels, when including the results adjusted
 for promotional prices.
 13Joint tests of significance were performed for the appropriate binary and interaction terms. For
 example, for national brand dairy, we tested Ho: COMPETE + COMPETEDAIRY = COMPARE +
 COMPAREDAIRY.
 14These values were obtained by multiplying the weighted average percentage of products on sale
 in any given week at Stop n' Shop and Big Y by the average percentage discount. For example, table
 6 reports that the overall discount from promotions of national brand (NB) products at competing
 stores is 3.81%. It is computed as follows. The weighted average promotional price reduction of the
 NB products found in our market basket at competing stores was 24.64%. Across Stop n' Shop and
 Big Y stores, a weighted average of 15.47% of NB products were on promotion in any given week.
 Therefore the estimated overall price reduction encountered by consumers is .2464 * .1547 = .0381, or
 3.81%. We have no data on the promotional activity of IGA stores, which constitute two of the twelve
 supermarkets sampled for this study. These calculations assume that IGA's promotions follow the
 weighted promotion average of Stop n' Shop and Big Y.
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 Appendix A: Stores Sampled and their Characteristics
 Median Store
 Household Size
 Store Type Location Population Income ($) (sq. feet)
 Wal-Mart Supercenter North Windham, 38,680 30,155 55,000
 CT
 Super Stop Competing North Windham, 38,680 30,155 41,000
 n' Shop CT
 Super Stop Comparison Vernon-Rockville, 35,771 44,510 37,000
 n' Shop CT
 Wal-Mart Supercenter Westerly, RI 22,966 44,613 57,000
 Super Stop Competing Westerly, RI 22,966 44,613 47,000
 n' Shop
 Super Stop Comparison Seekonk, MA 13,425 56,364 51,000
 n' Shop
 Wal-Mart Supercenter Jewett City, CT 3,053 45,826 63,000
 Better Value Competing Jewett City, CT 3,053 45,826 22,000
 IGA
 Better Value Comparison Plainfield, CT 14,619 42,851 15,000
 IGA
 Wal-Mart Supercenter Ware, MA 9,707 36,875 55,000
 Big Y Competing Ware, MA 9,707 36,875 29,000
 Big Y Comparison Stafford Springs, 11,307 52,699 35,000
 CT
 Wal-Mart Supercenter Waterford, CT 19,152 56,047 66,000
 Super Stop Competing Waterford, CT 19,152 56,047 50,000
 n' Shop
 Super Stop Comparison Fairhaven, MA 16,159 41,696 60,000
 n' Shop
 Wal-Mart Supercenter Raynham, MA 11,739 64,464 67,000
 Super Stop Competing Raynham, MA 11,739 64,464 67,000
 n' Shop
 Stop n' Comparison Attleboro, MA 42,068 50,807 60,000
 Shop
 Wal-Mart Supercenters in New England 23
 Appendix B: The Market Basket of Products
 Minimum Maximum Average Standard
 Product Department Price ($) Price ($) Price ($) Deviation ($)
 Coca-Cola 2-liter Grocery 1.07 1.59 1.38 0.17
 PL Cola 2-liter Grocery 0.50 0.99 0.66 0.16
 Maxwell House Grocery 1.97 3.29 2.49 0.46
 Coffee (13 oz.)
 PL coffee (13 oz.) Grocery 1.67 2.69 2.03 0.37
 Bumble Bee tuna Grocery 1.12 1.59 1.38 0.17
 (6 oz.)
 PL tuna (6 oz.) Grocery 0.88 1.39 1.17 0.16
 Cheerios (15 oz.) Grocery 2.44 3.99 3.15 0.62
 PL O-shaped Grocery 1.50 2.88 2.02 0.47
 cereal (15 oz.)
 Lays potato chips Grocery 1.99 2.99 2.66 0.48
 (12 oz.)
 PL potato chips Grocery 1.47 1.99 1.77 0.25
 (12 oz.)
 Kraft Mac n' Grocery 0.66 1.39 0.97 0.19
 Cheese
 (7.25 oz.)
 PL Mac n' Cheese Grocery 0.33 0.60 0.44 0.10
 (7.25 oz.)
 Prego pasta Grocery 1.50 2.69 2.00 0.38
 sauce (26 oz.)
 PL pasta sauce Grocery 1.00 1.59 1.29 0.23
 (26 oz.)
 Jif creamy peanut Grocery 2.68 3.89 3.11 0.34
 butter (28 oz.)
 PL creamy Grocery 2.12 2.89 2.49 0.25
 peanut butter
 (28 oz.)
 Del Monte sliced Grocery 0.88 1.59 1.25 0.24
 peaches
 (15.25 oz.)
 PL sliced peaches Grocery 0.78 1.29 0.99 0.18
 (15.25 oz.)
 Nabisco chips Grocery 2.50 4.15 3.21 0.59
 ahoy (16 oz.)
 PL chocolate chip Grocery 0.78 2.99 1.92 0.88
 cookies (16 oz.)
 Heinz ketchup Grocery 1.29 1.99 1.65 0.20
 (24 oz.)
 PL ketchup Grocery 0.78 1.39 1.07 0.19
 (24 oz.)
 Bisquik pancake Grocery 2.23 3.19 2.72 0.35
 mix (40 oz.)
 PL pancake mix Grocery 1.15 2.49 1.79 0.45
 (40 oz.)
 (Continued)
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 Table Appendix B. Continued
 Minimum Maximum Average Standard
 Product Department Price ($) Price ($) Price ($) Deviation ($)
 Hood milk 1% Dairy 2.96 4.15 3.51 0.44
 milk (gallon)
 PL 1% milk Dairy 2.37 3.75 2.94 0.47
 (gallon)
 Kraft American Dairy 1.97 3.99 2.87 0.85
 singles (16 ct.)
 PL American Dairy 1.77 3.35 2.47 0.65
 singles (16 ct.)
 Land o' Lakes Dairy 3.24 4.77 4.03 0.67
 butter (1 lb.)
 PL butter (1 lb.) Dairy 2.50 3.99 3.08 0.55
 Breyers vanilla Frozen 3.24 6.57 4.70 1.08
 ice cream
 (1/2 gal.)
 PL vanilla ice Frozen 2.50 5.49 3.41 1.02
 cream
 (1/2 gal.)
 Eggo homestyle Frozen 1.50 2.37 1.85 0.32
 waffles (10 ct.)
 PL homestyle Frozen 1.00 1.99 1.28 0.35
 waffles (10 ct.)
 Birdseye frozen Frozen 0.73 1.89 1.14 0.34
 broccoli
 (10 oz.)
 PL frozen Frozen 0.59 1.19 0.89 0.20
 broccoli
 (10 oz.)
 Q-Tips cotton HBA 2.95 3.99 3.57 0.47
 swabs (500 ct.)
 PL cotton swabs HBA 1.88 3.49 2.73 0.66
 (500 ct.)
 Dial antibacterial HBA 1.62 2.65 2.06 0.32
 soap (3 ct.)
 PL antibacterial HBA 1.47 1.99 1.58 0.19
 soap (3 ct.)
 Edge shaving gel HBA 1.78 3.89 2.65 0.50
 (7 oz.)
 PL shaving gel HBA 1.14 3.59 1.92 0.74
 (7 oz.)
 Purdue chicken Meat 0.59 2.29 1.62 0.58
 drumsticks
 (1 lb.)
 PL chicken Meat 0.59 2.29 1.29 0.43
 drumsticks
 (1 lb.)
 Perri Italian Meat 2.38 3.99 3.40 0.78
 sausage (1 lb.)
 (Continued)
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 Table Appendix B. Continued
 Minimum Maximum Average Standard
 Product Department Price ($) Price ($) Price ($) Deviation ($)
 PL Italian Meat 2.22 4.59 2.96 0.64
 sausage (1 lb.)
 Oscar Meyer Meat 4.87 5.49 4.98 0.14
 bacon (1 lb.)
 PL bacon (1 lb.) Meat 1.98 4.99 3.29 0.61
 Perfect orchard Produce 2.44 3.99 3.38 0.64
 red delicious
 apples (1 lb.)
 Russet red Produce 0.66 1.69 1.24 0.30
 potatoes (1 lb.)
 Bolthouse farms Produce 0.58 1.99 0.83 0.47
 carrots (1 lb.)
 Foxy lettuce head Produce 0.78 1.99 1.30 0.41
 (head)
 Chiquita bananas Produce 0.38 0.69 0.55 0.11
 (1 lb.)
 Foxy celery (1 lb.) Produce 1.24 2.21 1.57 0.33
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